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ABSTRACT 
Liability for psychiatric injury, also known as nervous shock, may pose several challenges when 
considered as an aspect of personal injury. Within the context of Bahamian tort law, it is an 
emerging area, which so far has been dealt with only briefly. Several questions arise when 
assessing nervous shock, such as determining whether a defendant is liable and whether the 
plaintiff should be awarded damages. In The Bahamas the approach has been similar to that in 
other jurisdictions such as England and other Commonwealth states. In these jurisdictions the 
issue has been whether the cause of the psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable, especially 
where the claimant did not suffer any physical injury or was not directly involved in the accident. 
This article reflects on The Bahamas’ approach to nervous shock, the correlation of “time and 
space,” where the claimant is said to have witnessed the injury: it will present a discussion of the 
current understanding of nervous shock and whether it constitutes an appropriate claim.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The concept of nervous shock in negligence, 
recognises the elements of time and space, 
and considers whether the victim should be 
entitled to damages based on psychiatric 
injury suffered consequential upon the shock 
sustained, not from direct contact, but 
through the medium of the eye or the ear. At 
first sight, this aspect of personal injury, 
which affects the mind, may appear 
incomprehensible but Bahamian case law 
affirms that “damages for nervous shock 
caused by negligence can be made without 
immediate personal injury to oneself” 
(Wilchombe vs Princess Margaret Hospital, 
p. 25).  
Consider the case of Wilchombe vs Princess 
Margaret Hospital: Infant Dominique 
Wilchcombe* was born on Tuesday August 
6, 1996, at the New Beginning Birthing 
Centre, Nassau, The Bahamas. She was 
transferred to the Special Care Baby Unit of 
the Princess Margaret Hospital for 
observation because her umbilical cord was 
around her neck at birth. She later developed 
a fatal Acinetobacter spp. infection 
(Mcdonald et al., 1998). 
The Acinetobacter spp. bacteria are found 
primarily in water and soil and cause human 
disease. It is especially prevalent in intensive 
care units of hospitals (Centers for Disease 
Control and Infection, 2010). After being 
infected with Acinetobacter spp., infant 
Dominique died four days later on August 
10, 1996. Her parents sued the hospital to 
recover damages for psychiatric injury 
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because of her death. The relevant question 
was whether the hospital could be held liable 
for psychiatric injury suffered by the parents 
who witnessed her death. The analysis of 
this case is based on a traumatic event 
culminating in a claim for nervous shock 
and/or psychiatric damage.  
PRINCIPLES ADVANCED 
Nervous shock is an area of law in which the 
courts have expanded their approach for 
damages in respect of negligently inflicted 
psychiatric injury. In medical terms, 
psychiatric injury may be considered as an 
aspect of personal injury (Kodilinye, 2009, 
p. 122). The courts have ruled that a 
plaintiff, in some instances, may recover 
damages for nervous shock brought on by an 
injury not to himself or herself, but rather to 
a near relative. The challenges in these cases 
occur because the claimant is not the 
primary victim and the injury sustained is in 
the mind. This is considered problematic for 
the law because it is believed that it presents 
a greater risk of inaccurate diagnosis and the 
line between ‘mental and physical’ is not 
fully, scientifically understood (Rogers, 
2006, p. 225). The mind is an unseen 
element and mental injury is, in contrast to 
physical injury, often difficult to determine; 
therefore, trying to reconcile even the fear of 
such injury, could be considered subjective. 
In addition, there is the principal issue of 
proximity, denoting ‘time and space’, which 
may appear to lead to an illogical 
conclusion. It raises the question of 
foreseeability of injury and remoteness of 
damage in negligence. It considers the 
question of whether the accident caused or 
materially contributed to the plaintiff's 
deteriorating condition. The difficulty the 
courts face is in determining the 
circumstances in which there should be 
compensation for psychiatric injury and 
which could be regarded as reasonably 
foreseeable where the claimant had no direct 
involvement in the accident.  
DISCUSSION 
At the outset, it is important to note that 
when one considers the term “nervous 
shock” legally, it is taken to mean mental 
injury or psychiatric illness and not simply 
grief and sorrow (Wilchombe vs Princess 
Margaret Hospital). The criterion which if 
used identifies nervous shock, resulting in 
liability, cannot in and of itself relate to 
psychiatric illness carte blanche. This was 
clarified in the case of Eastern Airlines Inc. 
vs Floyd. In this case there was a near crash 
landing of an Eastern Airlines flight between 
Miami, Florida and The Bahamas. The 
United States Supreme Court held only by 
virtue of the Warsaw Convention, that 
compensation was not allowed for purely 
mental injuries (Eastern Airlines Inc. vs 
Floyd, pp. 534-553). The critical issue for 
the Supreme Court in determining the 
liability of Eastern Airlines was that in 1929, 
under the Warsaw Convention, personal 
injury did not encompass psychiatric 
injuries. 
The House of Lords, authorities considered 
highly persuasive in The Bahamas, noted in 
Page vs Smith that nervous shock means a 
reaction to an “immediate and horrifying 
impact, resulting in some recognizable 
psychiatric illness” (p. 736). Lord Keith of 
Kinkel observed that there must be some 
serious mental disturbance outside the range 
of normal human experience (p. 739). His 
Lordship noted that such mental disturbance 
goes beyond ordinary emotions of anxiety, 
grief or fear. The recognition of a serious 
mental disorder not associated with direct 
personal injury, represents the increasing 
recognition by the courts that although at 
common law damages cannot be awarded 
for grief and sorrow, damages for psychiatric 
illness may be made where there is injury by 
shock without direct contact (Alleyne vs 
Attorney General, p. 10). It may be a 
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difficult concept to assimilate that a person 
may be awarded damages caused by shock 
applicable through the eye or ear without 
direct contact. However, once it is 
understood that psychiatric harm is 
comparable to physical harm, one cannot 
then disregard that liability may be possible 
for the wrongdoer. Sustaining an injury from 
a blow inflicted by a stone to the head is no 
less significant than an immediate and 
horrifying impact to the mind. Once the time 
of the accident is concurrent with the 
resulting shock, psychiatric harm is 
significant to a claim in negligence.  
The immediacy of the tort was seen in 
Alcock vs Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police (p. 907), a leading English 
law tort case. In this case, fans died in a 
massive crush during a semifinal football 
game, at the Hillsborough Stadium in 
Sheffield, England. Lord Oliver observed 
that cases classified as nervous shock should 
be divided broadly into two categories. The 
first category are those in which the plaintiff 
was involved as a participant in the incident 
giving rise to the action–the primary 
victims–and those where the plaintiff was a 
witness to the injury caused to others–the 
secondary victims. 
In order to differentiate between primary 
victims and secondary victims, it is 
important to note that as with any other 
injury in tort, the claimant in cases of 
nervous shock must establish a duty of care. 
The concept of a duty of care presumes that 
individuals have a legal obligation to others 
for risks of harm that may be reasonably 
foreseeable. This foreseeability of harm was 
developed in the case of Donoghue vs 
Stevenson (p. 562), where Lord Atkin 
enunciated the neighbourhood principle:  
You must take reasonable care to avoid 
acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to 
injure your neighbour. Who then, in law 
is my neighbour? The answer seems to 
be persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected 
when I am directing my mind to the acts 
or omissions which are called in 
question (p. 580). 
The neighbourhood principle and the 
concept of duty of care encompass both the 
primary victim and the secondary victim. 
The primary victim is directly affected by 
the accident and can reasonably be seen as 
being within the contemplation of the 
wrongdoer. If we reflect on the Hillsborough 
disaster it can be reasonably deduced that 
those victims who died or were injured 
during the stampede should have been in the 
contemplation of the officers, calculating 
that if an excessively large number of people 
were allowed into the stadium, in relation to 
the capacity to comfortably house them, then 
in the event of a disaster, the likelihood of 
harm was almost a certainty. 
On the other hand, in the case of Alleyne vs 
Attorney General, the Barbadian High Court 
was not prepared to rule on nervous shock 
where the claimant’s deceased baby was 
accidentally incinerated. According to Reifer 
J, there was no causal link between the 
plaintiff’s psychiatric illness and the 
defendant’s negligence as the evidence 
failed the threshold test of breach of duty. 
The claimant was unable to establish 
reasonable foreseeability, which did not fall 
within the “control mechanism” of the 
persons responsible. In Wilchombe vs 
Princess Margaret Hospital, Small J 
referred to Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin 
vs O’Brian, when he noted that because 
nervous shock is capable of affecting a wide 
range of people, the law needs to put some 
limitation on admissible claims: “(1) the 
class of persons whose claims should be 
The International Journal of Bahamian Studies  Vol. 21 #1 (2015) 
B. Bain. Nervous Shock   25 
recognised, (2) the proximity of such 
persons to the accident and (3) the means by 
which the shock is caused” (Wilchombe vs 
Princess Margaret Hospital, p. 29). The 
control mechanism therefore anticipates 
reasonable foresight, once negligence has 
been established. A duty of care could be 
presumed where it is reasonable to expect 
that a hospital maintain a clean environment, 
free from deadly bacteria. It is medically 
known that the Acineobacter spp. bacterium 
is easily spread to vulnerable patients and 
special attention should be paid to infection 
control procedures. These clinical factors 
relate to the third arm of Lord Wilberforce’s 
control mechanism in classifying nervous 
shock.  
The court in Bourhill vs Young (p. 92) held 
no duty of care was owed to Mrs. Bourhill, 
the plaintiff, even though she was in the 
vicinity of a fatal motorcycle crash and 
witnessed the accident caused by the 
negligence of the defendant in which the 
defendant was killed. She claimed she heard 
the accident and saw the aftermath of it and 
this caused her baby stillborn. It was held 
that the defendant was not liable because it 
was not reasonably foreseeable that she 
would suffer nervous shock. She was not in 
danger herself nor was she closely connected 
with the deceased by way of a relationship. 
She was not of the class of persons whose 
claims should be recognised. 
However, in McLoughlin vs O’Brian, the 
majority of the members of the House of 
Lords found the defendant liable, after the 
plaintiff viewed the badly battered and 
bloodied bodies of her family following their 
involvement in a road traffic accident. There 
must therefore be a close tie of love and 
affection between the plaintiffs, a secondary 
victim, as was noted in Alcock vs Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire Police. Where 
the claimant is the primary victim it matters 
not whether the injury was physical or 
psychiatric, the test remains the same. In the 
case of Page vs Smith it was held that the 
defendant was liable for damages for 
nervous shock suffered by a primary victim 
of the accident if personal injury to that 
person was reasonably foreseeable. The 
victim is not required to prove that nervous 
shock was reasonably foreseeable, where it 
is foreseeable that the victim may suffer 
physical injury from the act or omission of 
the defendant. This was likewise noted by 
Lord Bridge in McLoughlin vs O’Brian (p. 
312) where the interrelation between 
physical and psychiatric injury was 
observed. The suffering sustained by a 
patient from psychiatric disorders is no less 
painful or disabling than that inflicted by 
physical injury.  
There is no doubt that the claimant mother 
in the Barbadian case of Alleyne vs Attorney 
General, suffered mental distress because of 
the accidental incineration of her deceased 
infant. The court did not determine that her 
psychiatric illness at the time of the trial 
gave rise to nervous shock, which would 
have enabled the court to find the defendant 
hospital liable. Reifer J reiterated that even 
though nervous shock is reasonably 
foreseeable, the law does not award damage 
if the psychiatric injury was not induced by 
shock. This would involve a horrifying event 
which violently agitates the mind. This 
judgment by Reifer J begs the question of 
what is to be classified as a horrifying event. 
It affirms the challenges of the court when 
considering an injury involving not only the 
mind but also the relationship of the parties. 
In the Alleyne case, the psychiatric illness 
occurred over a period of time, not in the 
immediate aftermath and the case therefore 
failed the threshold test of breach of duty. It 
appears that the court in Alleyne vs Attorney 
General did not consider the time period of 
three months as being in the immediate 
aftermath, and so the case did not fit the 
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control mechanism significant to time and 
space.  
In the Bahamian case of Wilchombe vs 
Princess Margaret Hospital, Small J 
adopted Lord Wilberforce’s control 
mechanism of time and space as applicable 
to proximity of the relationship between the 
claimant parents and the defendants. The 
Wilchcombes, parents of Dominique, had 
anticipated her recovery and eventual 
discharge, not her death within three days of 
birth. Relationship, time, space, and 
reasonable foreseeability were prima facie 
evidence of the hospital’s liability. It was 
fair and just that the parents be compensated 
for the injury suffered. 
CONCLUSION 
It may be deduced from the ruling by Small 
J in the Bahamian case of Wilchombe vs 
Princess Margaret Hospital that the 
Bahamas’ approach in determining liability 
in nervous shock is the same as that of other 
common-law jurisdictions. Courts in these 
jurisdictions realize the challenges faced 
when assessing injury of the claimant, a 
secondary victim. Psychiatric illness, unlike 
physical illness, creates difficulties, because 
the injury is sustained through the medium 
of the eye or ear and weighs heavily on 
mental determination. In determining 
liability for nervous shock, the Bahamian 
court was mindful of the judgment of Lord 
Keith in Page vs Smith in ruling out 
emotional distress, in contrast to a serious 
mental disturbance. Like any other personal 
injury matter, foreseeability remains a 
relevant principle in nervous shock, where 
the control mechanism of time and space 
must be applied. Small J’s ruling in 
Wilchombe vs Princess Margaret Hospital, 
has set a noteworthy precedent for future 
claims for nervous shock.  
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